{"id":7197,"date":"2017-09-30T14:17:48","date_gmt":"2017-09-30T14:17:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/?p=7197"},"modified":"2017-09-30T14:17:48","modified_gmt":"2017-09-30T14:17:48","slug":"is-the-sp-500-just-another-large-cap-growth-fund","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/?p=7197","title":{"rendered":"Is the SP 500 Just Another Large-Cap Growth Fund ?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>(This blog post could be classified as &#8211; somewhat like the Jerry Seinfeld show &#8211; a post about nothing. I&#8217;m just thinking out loud about the popularity of indexing and what clients miss in the &#8220;index game&#8221;.)<\/p>\n<p>Strategas Partners, the highly-regarded and well-respected macro research firm out of New York, came through Chicago 6 &#8211; 8 weeks ago and one of the theme&#8217;s of the presentation was &#8220;Have we reached peak passive?&#8221; in terms of the individual investor&#8217;s (and presumably some institutional) preference for index funds and ETF&#8217;s.<\/p>\n<p>More ETF&#8217;s and &#8220;style-box&#8221; funds are being used for my own clients than ever before but large-cap stock picking hasn&#8217;t been abandoned for this very reason.<\/p>\n<p>What fascinates me is that when I talk to clients about index funds or ETF&#8217;s is that they don&#8217;t see these vehicles as baskets of stocks but rather some kind of &#8220;magic bullet&#8221; solution to investing.<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Here is the top 10 stocks in the SP 500 as of 12\/31\/1999<\/strong><\/em> with their respective market cap weights:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1.) Microsoft: $604 billion<\/li>\n<li>2.) GE: $507 billion<\/li>\n<li>3.) Cisco System: $306 billion<\/li>\n<li>4.) WalMart: $308 billion<\/li>\n<li>5.) Exxon: $278 billion<\/li>\n<li>6.) Intel: $274 billion<\/li>\n<li>7.) Lucent: $234 billion<\/li>\n<li>8.) IBM: $194 billion<\/li>\n<li>9.)\u00a0 Citigroup: $187 billion<\/li>\n<li>10.) America Online: $170 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total mkt cap: approximately $3.1 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em><strong>Commentary:<\/strong> <\/em>the pinnacle of the Tech bubble in the late 1990&#8217;s, early 2000&#8217;s saw 6 Tech companies in the Top 10 market cap positions in the SP 500, two of which &#8211; for all practical purposes are not around 10 years later (Lucent and AOL). The largest so-called Industrial component, GE, was nothing more than a bank, with a few Industrial businesses bolted on to it.<\/p>\n<p>Source: ETFConnect<\/p>\n<p>By 2002, here is how the &#8220;Top 10&#8221; composition of the SP 500 had changed:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1.) Microsoft: $276 billion<\/li>\n<li>2.) GE: $242 billion<\/li>\n<li>3.) Exxon: $235 billion<\/li>\n<li>4.) WalMart: $223 billion<\/li>\n<li>5.) Pfizer: $188 bl<\/li>\n<li>6.) Citigroup: $178 billion<\/li>\n<li>7.) Johnson &amp; Johnson: $160 billion<\/li>\n<li>8.) AIG $151 billion<\/li>\n<li>9.) IBM: $131 billion<\/li>\n<li>10.) Merck: $127 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total mkt cap: $1.9 trillion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Source: ETFConnect<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Commentary:<\/strong><\/em> In just 2 years, the Top 10 components had lost $1 trillion in market cap in total, and the number of Tech companies within the Top 10 had fallen from 6 to 2, by the end of 2002. In a more defensive market that we saw in 2000, 2001 and 2002, Health Care names were now 3 of the Top 10 SP 500 components. Microsoft lost over half its value in terms of its market cap and STILL retained the #1 position in the SP 500.<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Here are the Top 10 stocks in the SP 500 today (as of 9\/28\/17)<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1.) Apple: $796 billion<\/li>\n<li>2.) Alphabet: $670 billion<\/li>\n<li>3.) Microsoft: $574 billion<\/li>\n<li>4.) Facebook: $596 billion<\/li>\n<li>5.) Amazon: $462 billion<\/li>\n<li>6.) Berkshire Hathaway: $452 billion<\/li>\n<li>7.) Johnson &amp; Johnson: $349 billion<\/li>\n<li>8.) Exxon Mobil: $347 billion<\/li>\n<li>9.) JP Morgan: $336 billion<\/li>\n<li>10.) Bank of America: $267 billion<\/li>\n<li>Total mkt cap: approximately $4.1 billion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Source: Morningstar SPY holdings as of 9\/28\/17<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Commentary:<\/strong><\/em> what caught my eye about today&#8217;s Top 10 composition is that Microsoft, in the #3 position, actually has a smaller market cap today in September, 2017 than its market cap in December, 1999. Microsoft has had 9 stock splits in its history, but only one has occurred since 2000, and that was a 2-for-1 split in February, 2003.<\/p>\n<p>In March, 2000, Microsoft had over 11.2 billion fully diluted common stock shares outstanding, but today &#8211; thanks to share repurchases over 17 years, that number has shrunk to 7.8 billion. This is why even though Microsoft&#8217;s stock price is trading at an all-time-high, the market cap is lower than in December, 1999. (You could make the case MSFT&#8217;s valuation is a lot more reasonable, too.)<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>From 2000 to 2002, the Nasdaq fell between 80% &#8211; 90% in value (check the annual returns<a href=\"http:\/\/www.1stock1.com\/1stock1_140.htm\"> here<\/a>) and yet the SP 500 earnings actual rose from 1999 to 2000 from $50 to $55 per share. (That was a surprise when looking at the data.)<\/p>\n<p>During the Tech crash from 1999 through the end of 2002, here is how actual SP 500 EPS tracked:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1999: $50.82<\/li>\n<li>2000: $55.12<\/li>\n<li>2001: $45.16<\/li>\n<li>2002: $47.94<\/li>\n<li>2003: $55.44<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The SP 500 bottomed in March, 2003 coincident with the start of Gulf War II.<\/p>\n<p>Readers might think that this blog is comparing apples to oranges, with the Nasdaq vs the SP 500, but today the SP 500&#8217;s top 6 names are all Technology names, it is just that the valuation of the Nasdaq today at 23(x) &#8211; 25(x) earnings is far more reasonable today than the 80(x) &#8211; 100(x) P.E of the late 1990&#8217;s.<\/p>\n<p>The SP 500 is trading today at 17(x) &#8211; 18(x) forward earnings vs, the 27(x) &#8211; 28(x) from the late 1990&#8217;s.<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Conclusion: So What&#8217;s the Point of the blog post ?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p>The SP 500 fell 50% from its March, 2000 high to its October, 2002 low and yet SP 500 earnings remained almost flat for the 3 years.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>P\/E expansion \/ contraction matters<\/li>\n<li>Market cap matters<\/li>\n<li>Valuation matters<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The powerful, secular bull markets like the 1980&#8217;s and 1990&#8217;s are really driven by P.E expansion. &#8220;The market&#8221; (so to speak) affords a higher multiple to a given level of earnings growth, particularly if the SP 500 earnings growth is accelerating.<\/p>\n<p>Barry Ritholz <a href=\"http:\/\/ritholtz.com\/2013\/02\/visual-history-of-the-sp-500\/\">wrote a similar article<\/a> to this one way back in 2012, without my bloviated commentary. Like the well-trained lawyer that he is, Barry simply left the SP 500 rankings out there for readers to digest.<\/p>\n<p>Bottom line: after the 50% correction in the SP 500 in the early 2000&#8217;s, i began to think of the SP 500 as just another large-cap growth fund. The best companies will rise to the top of the SP 500 (for various reasons, as a growth-oriented market like the late 1990&#8217;s or as a defensive market like 2000 &#8211; 2002.)<\/p>\n<p>Josef Schumpeter, the Austrian economist for whom the term &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Joseph_Schumpeter\">Schumpeter&#8217;s creative destruction<\/a>&#8221; was coined may describe the process the best, for both the SP 500 and the US economy, and the link between the two is far more &#8220;causal&#8221; than retail investors probably realize.<\/p>\n<p>Excuse the long-winded commentary. With indexing, just know what you own in the index.<\/p>\n<p>Thanks for reading.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>(This blog post could be classified as &#8211; somewhat like the Jerry Seinfeld show &#8211; a post about nothing. I&#8217;m&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[194,9,195,123],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7197","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-market-cap-weights","category-sp-500","category-schumpeters-creative-destruction","category-technology"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7197","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7197"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7197\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7208,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7197\/revisions\/7208"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7197"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7197"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fundamentalis.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7197"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}